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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we present Markov-based probability models for two important 
problems related to current combat situations: fire allocating of salvos against multiple 
targets, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks on convoys transporting supply 
and troops. For the fire allocation problem, we suggest a certain shooting tactics, called 
Persistent Shooting, and explore the effect of various engagement parameters using a 
discrete time Markov chain. We consider the scenario where a single shooter engages a 
set of targets by a series of salvos. The shooter has a limited number of munitions to 
deliver and the question is how to allocate the fire in the presence of limited BDA 
capabilities. For the IED problem, we explore the effect of various tactical parameters on 
the IED threat and on the resulting attrition of the friendly force using a continuous time 
Markov chain.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As technology progresses, battlefields are getting more complicated and the 
intensity of conflicts increases. There is an emerging trend to develop smart weapons that 
use passive and active sensors to accurately kill their targets without much collateral 
damage. However, most of these smart weapons deploy only a single payload to take out 
the intended target.  
Contrary to the development of smart weapons by regular armed forces, 
insurgents and terrorists adopt tactics of asymmetric warfare, using relatively low-
technology means that can be easily deployed by small groups diffused in the general 
population. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and suicide attacks are such tactics that 
are commonly used in Iraq and Afghanistan. These attacks are hard to predict, and a huge 
amount of intelligence is required to counter them effectively. 
We develop two models aimed at obtaining insights about these two important 
issues related to current combat situations: fire allocating of salvos against multiple 
targets and IEDs attacks on convoys transporting supply and troops. 
For the fire allocation problem, we consider a scenario where a shooter delivers a 
series of salvos onto a target area with the objective to kill a cluster of targets. The 
shooter has a limited number of munitions and has some prior intelligence about the type 
of targets in the area of operation. Before delivering a salvo, the shooter employs a sensor 
for detecting and collecting intelligence for better targeting. Based on the information 
obtained by the sensor, the shooter determines the fire allocation rule for the next salvo. 
This sequence of sensing and salvos repeats itself until the mission is over.  
We develop a discrete time Markov chain model for the salvo shooting process to 
obtain some tactical insights regarding the effect of various engagement parameters. We 
show that for our shooting tactics (persistent shooting) and a certain set of realistic 
parameter values, delivering higher number of munitions in a salvo with smaller number 
of salvos is more effective than the reverse. 
 xviii
In the second problem, we consider a road segment where insurgents are placing 
IEDs to prevent friendly forces from transporting supply convoys through it. The friendly 
forces have IED-clearance units that patrol the road segment, searching for IEDs and 
attempting to neutralize them. There are three processes that determine the situation: (1) 
insurgents placing IEDs on the road segment, (2) friendly forces dispatching supply 
convoys that must cross the road segment and thus are vulnerable to IED attacks, and (3) 
IED-clearance units patrolling the road segment, detecting and neutralizing IEDs. We 
focus on the effects of different parameters on the attrition rate of a convoy passing 
through the road segment under two different scenarios: 
• Basic operational scenario: Convoys and clearance teams traversing a road 
segment infested with IEDs 
• Advanced logistical scenario: Basic operational scenario with inventory 
control that affects the traffic on the road segment. 
We explore a range of operational settings by both the friendly forces and the 
insurgents in terms of convoy dispatch rates, IEDs placement rates, the probability of 
detecting and neutralizing the IED, the probability of hitting the convoys, and the 
maximum capacity of the number of IEDs present in the road segment. We wish to 
understand which parameters are important and where to invest to reduce the friendly 
force attrition rates. 
We develop continuous-time Markov models to capture the key aspects that 
describe the situation and implement them computationally to obtain some tactical 
insights regarding the effect of various operational parameters on the outcome of convoy 
transportation missions in the presence of IEDs. 
We show limiting the rate of convoys traveling through the road segment and at 
the same time increasing the rate of dispatching clearance units and improving the 
detecting and neutralizing capabilities will greatly reduce the attrition rate of convoys. 
We also show that by increasing the number of trucks in each convoy, and thus 
reducing the frequency that convoys need to be sent out, and by fixing the order point in 
the destination level to a higher level by keeping larger inventory, will also reduce the 
attrition rate of the convoys. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
As technology progresses in modern warfare, battlefields are becoming more 
complicated and the intensity of conflicts increases. Smart weapons utilize passive and 
active sensors to accurately kill their targets without much collateral damage. Such 
weapons are the subject of technological and operational research in many countries (Y. 
G. Liu & J. P. Hu, 1998) and (R. P. Hallion, 1997). Employing such weapons may 
involve using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to first search and detect the targets (M. 
Kress, & J. O. Royset, August 2007) and thereafter deploying smart weapons to kill 
them. Most smart weapons deploy a single payload to take out the intended target 
(Federation of Scientist, 2008).  
Contrary to the development of smart weapons by regular armed forces, 
insurgents and terrorists adopt tactics of asymmetric warfare, using relatively low-
technology means that can be easily deployed by small groups that are diffused in the 
general population. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and suicide attacks are such 
tactics that are commonly used in Iraq and Afghanistan. These attacks are hard to predict, 
and a huge amount of intelligence is required to counter them effectively. 
In this thesis, we develop models aimed at obtaining insights about two important 
issues related to current combat situations: (1) fire allocating of salvos against multiple 
targets (e.g., insurgents’ strongholds), (2) IEDs attacks on convoys transporting supplies 
and troops. 
1. Salvos Allocation - Persistent Shooting Tactics 
Precision weapons can engage targets with great accuracy and lethality, but to use 
these capabilities effectively weapons must rely on accurate and timely information 
generated by Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. These systems not only allow a 
commander to have timely and accurate information and situational awareness (SA) of 
the battlefield, but they also provide a real-time live feed that gives the shooter the ability 
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to assess the damage inflicted on targets by previous shots and thus better utilize his 
weapon. This process of evaluating the condition of targets following an engagement is 
called Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).  
However, with superior intelligence, SA and BDA are useless without the ability 
to strike targets with accuracy and lethality during the short window of opportunity 
normally present in the modern battlefield. Many of the targets in the modern battlefield 
are highly mobile and therefore they are time-sensitive or time-critical. In other words, 
once a target is acquired, the shooter has typically a small time window to engage it. 
Failure to kill the target during this time window will provide it an opportunity to hide or 
even counter fire at the shooter’s location if the opponent also has good C4ISR 
capabilities. Therefore, weapon systems that can produce large and accurate salvos of fire 
are important in the modern battlefield; they may provide the edge over the opponent.  
To look into this area, we develop a model for the persistent shooting tactics 
applied to a series of salvos, which generalizes the single shot persistent shooting tactics 
presented in (Y. Aviv, & M. Kress, 1997). We obtain some tactical insights regarding the 
effect of various engagement parameters. The Persistent Shooter uses shoot-look-shoot 
tactics and he might have imperfect BDA capabilities. The model is a discrete-time 
Markov chain. 
2. Dispatching Convoys and Clearance Teams in the Presence of 
Improvised Explosive Device 
The use and effect of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by insurgents against 
coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has been of major concern (G. Zorpette, 2008; B. 
Hooffman, 2004; & D. W. Barno, 2007). These devices are normally homemade from 
readily available materials, ranging from explosive material to toxic chemicals. They are 
made by small groups who are trained in making and deploying IEDs.  
IEDs pose the greatest threat to coalition forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
killing 1811 coalition forces in Iraq and 261 coalition forces in Afghanistan as of 
November 2008 (Icasualties.org, 2008). Figure 1 shows the trend of coalition forces 
causalities since July 2004. The IED attacks normally happen along modern highways, 
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which are used for speedy movement of forces. The traffic pattern is observed by the 
insurgents and can be easily predicted. Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, there are 200 to 
350 IED attacks every month around the world (Hazard Management Solutions, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1.   IED Fatalities by Month in Iraq (From: Icasualties.org, 2008) 
The construction of IEDs is relatively simple and uses readily available low-
technology devices such as mobile phones and car alarm systems. Using such means 
enables the shooter to be at a standoff position to fire the IED. However, with such low 
technology methods, an operator is normally required to observe the target. Figure 2 
shows a typical IED setup along a road segment. An obstruction is normally used to slow 
down traffic so as to allow the target to stay in the kill zone for a longer period to 
increase the probability of kill. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Typical setup of IED by insurgents. 
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Although the friendly forces are faced with these IED threats in day-to-day 
operations, there is still a need to send convoys to supply food and other necessities, as 
well as to move personnel for patrol and shift rotation. We develop models that capture 
key aspects of convoy transportation on roads infested with IEDs by using a continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC) that describes the situation and implement them to obtain 
some tactical insights regarding the effect of various operational parameters on the 
outcome of convoy transportation missions in the presence of IEDs. 
B.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Shoot Look Shoot Tactics 
We consider a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) tactic where the engagement comprises a 
series of salvos. A deterministic analysis of some general SLS tactics for a single shooter 
can be found in L. B. Anderson, (1989) and Y. Aviv and M. Kress (1997). This thesis 
aims to study certain shooting tactics in these settings and to study their effectiveness. 
Specifically, we will focus on shoot-look-shoot tactics where each “shot” is a series of 
salvos of several rounds of fire aimed at a certain target. Following each salvo, a sensor is 
deployed to observe the target, perform BDA, and update the situational awareness of the 
shooter regarding the targets. Based on the updated picture of the target area, the shooter 
decides which target to engage next.  
A target in the battlefield can be in three states: Live (L), Killed (K) or Evidently 
Killed (EK). A killed target may appear to be alive to the shooter if there are no signs to 
indicate otherwise. We assume that a previously killed target that was not evidently killed 
at the time of kill will not appear to the shooter as evidently killed later on unless it is 
engaged and “killed” again. 
We consider the scenario where a shooter delivers a series of salvos onto a target 
area with the objective to kill Valuable Targets (VTs). The shooter has a limited number 
of munitions and has prior intelligence about the type of targets in the area of operation. 
Before delivering a salvo, the shooter employs a sensor for detecting and collecting 
intelligence for better targeting. Based on the information obtained by the sensor, the 
shooter determines the fire allocation rule for the next salvo. This sequence of sensing 
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(“look”) and salvos (“shoot”) repeats itself until the mission is over. During this 
sequence, we assume that the target does not fire back at the shooter and therefore the 
shooter is not vulnerable.  
2. Improvised Explosive Device 
We consider a road segment (RS) in which the enemy is placing IEDs to prevent 
friendly forces from transporting supply convoys. The friendly forces have IED-clearance 
units that patrol the road segment, searching for IEDs and attempting to neutralize them. 
There are three processes that determine the situation: (1) The enemy placing IEDs on the 
road segment, (2) The friendly forces dispatching supply convoys that must cross the 
road segment and thus are vulnerable to IED attacks, and (3) IED-clearance units 
patrolling the road segment, detecting and neutralizing IEDs.  
We focus on the effects of different parameters and how each of them will affect 
the attrition rate of the convoy passing through the road segment under two different 
scenarios. 
• Basic operational scenario: Convoys and clearance teams traversing a road 
segment infested with IEDs 
• Advanced logistical scenario: Basic operational scenario with inventory 
control that affects the traffic on the road segment 
We explore a range of operational setting by both friendly forces and the 
insurgents in terms of convoy dispatch rates, IEDs placement rates, the probability of 
detecting and neutralizing the IED, the probability of hitting the convoys, and the 
maximum capacity of the number of IEDs present in the road segment. We wish to 
understand which parameters are important and where to invest to reduce friendly force 
attrition rates. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. BDA with Imperfect Sensors 
The sensors that are used in warfare are imperfect and may cue targets with 
errors. The errors arise when a sensor has imperfect sensitivity, which leads to false 
negative results, and imperfect specificity, which leads to false positive detections. These 
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errors cause false targeting where real (valuable) targets are overlooked while false 
(worthless) targets, such as dummies or previously killed valuable targets, are acquired 
and engaged.  
Because sensors are imperfect, it is typically difficult to get complete and accurate 
information about the presence, identity, and status of the targets in the area of 
operations. The probability of correctly detecting and assessing the status of a target may 
depend on the environment in the area of operations, the type of target, the type of 
weapon, and the type of sensor (Y. Aviv, & M. Kress, 1997). Furthermore, targets are 
dynamic and can move in and out of the area of operations, making the situation even 
more complex. 
The importance of deploying good sensors to provide accurate damage 
assessment is evident in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Cordesman, 2004). There 
is an increasing trend in using UAVs, which provide an aerial view for detecting both 
threats and targets, to improve the friendly forces’ BDA capabilities, largely in Iraq 
(Military.com, 2008). Although there is a great leap in the accuracy and precision of 
modern weapons, munitions fired at targets may still miss or cause only partial damage. 
This imperfection causes many problems in an urban setting as it may cause collateral 
damage to civilians and buildings. Good BDA capabilities will allow commanders to 
evaluate the situation correctly and therefore either fire more shots to kill the targets or 
save unnecessary shots that may otherwise expose the shooter for a longer time than 
necessary, making it vulnerable to enemy fire, and waste costly munitions that may result 
in logistical shortage.  
2. Fire Engagement Sequence  
The fire engagement of targets is usually broken down into three stages: 
detection, acquisition, and fire. In the detection stage, the weapon’s sensor searches the 
area of interest for potential targets using a certain search pattern (M. Kress, & R. 
Szechtman, 2008). In an ideal situation, the sensor will be able to search and detect all 
potential targets—real (valuable) and false (worthless). However, in real life, some 
targets may be overlooked. In the acquisition stage, the shooter acquires targets that 
 7
appear to be valuable. A VT has a significant impact on the objective of the military 
operation, while a worthless target (WT) is a target with no operational value, a false 
target, or a VT that is already killed. In the acquisition stage, the sensor and the command 
and control system attempt to identify among the detected targets those which are 
valuable. The search optimization with imperfect specificity is discussed in Danskin 
(1962), A. Baggesen (2005) and M. Kress, K. Y. Lin and R. Szechtman (2007). Finally, 
in the fire stage, the shooter shoots at the acquired targets with the objective to kill them.  
This three-stage process is repeated until one of the three following events occur: 
(1) a sufficient number of VTs are evidently killed, that is, the shooter is confident that 
the mission requirement for a number of killed VTs is satisfied, (2) the weapon runs out 
of ammunition, or (3) the mission is aborted because of operational reasons, such as 
threat to the shooter or reassignment of the shooter to another higher-priority mission. 
Finding the correct balance between sensors and shooters is a challenge and tradeoffs are 
required to optimize the use of assets (K. A. Yost & A. R. Washburn, 2000). The “Shoot 
Look Shoot” process is presented in the literature (L. B. Anderson, 1989; Y. Aviv & M. 
Kress, 1997; D. P. Gaver & P. A. Jacobs, 1997; K. A. Yost & A. R. Washburn, 2000; K. 
Glazebrook, & A. R. Washburn, 2004).  
3. Insurgents and IEDs 
Unmanned systems like Autonomous Ground Vehicle (AGV) has been developed 
by friendly forces (Defense Update, 2008) to provide surveillance to identify the human 
presence placing the IEDs and then report them to higher headquarters to take action (B. 
D. Miller, 2006). These systems patrol the area of operation autonomously to gather the 
intelligence. Guardium AGV shown in Figure 3 is one of the systems developed to do 
such tasks. Anther system that is currently in used in by the collation forces, shown in 
Figure 4, is the iRobot Packbot (Defense Update, 2008). It is normally used in defusing 
IEDs when they are detected.  
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Figure 3.   Guardium UGV (From: G-NIUS, 2008) 
 
Figure 4.   Packbot (From: iRobot, 2008) 
D.  CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
1. Persistent Shooter Model 
With the emersion of new technologies in both the sensors and shooters arena, 
munitions are getting more lethal, accurate, and have a longer range. However, these 
weapons are very expensive to deploy and the shooter will want to ensure that every 
munition fired is killing a valuable target and not a target that is worthless or has already 
been previously killed.  
After reviewing the literature of shoot-look-shoot shooting tactics, we notice that 
most of it involves a single-shot engagement process. The result obtained in this thesis 
for the salvo engagement process will allow commanders to increase their operational 
efficiency and utilization of the system through better decision-making when deploying 
their weaponry. 
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2. Improvised Explosive Device  
A huge investment has been put into finding means and techniques to reduce the 
risk of IEDs attack to friendly forces, and some progress has been made. However, the 
constant threat of IEDs is still evident in Iraq and Afghanistan. The insights captured in 
this thesis will allow field commanders to make better decisions regarding investments in 
counter-IED technologies and in planning transportation operations 
E.  STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter II, we develop a discrete-time Markov chain model for the persistent 
salvo shooting process and obtain some tactical insights regarding the effect of various 
engagement parameters. The model is built on the single shooter persistent shooting 
tactics that is presented in Aviv and Kress (1997). Chapter III describes the situation and 
implementation of CTMC to obtain some tactical insights regarding the effect of various 
operational parameters on the outcome of convoy transportation missions in the presence 
of IEDs. Chapter IV builds on the base model discussed in Chapter III to capture key 
aspects of supply convoy transportation on roads infested with IEDs along with supply 
and demand inventory constraints by using a CTMC. Chapter V gives the conclusions, 
broad insights derived from the previous chapters, and a series of future work ideas.  
 10
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II.  THE PERSISTENT SHOOTING TACTICS USING SALVOS 
In this chapter, we develop a model for the persistent shooting tactics applied to a 
series of salvos instead of the single shooter that is presented in Y. Aviv, M. Kress 
(1997). The Persistent Shooter uses a shoot-look-shoot tactics and he might have 
imperfect BDA capabilities. We develop a discrete-time Markov chain model for a salvo 
shooting process following this tactic and obtain some tactical insights regarding the 
effect of various engagement parameters. 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS 
The shooting process begins when the shooter is assigned a set of VTs, which are 
targets that are threatening to the friendly force or have a high value to the enemy. The 
shooter engages the targets with a series of salvos. Following a salvo, the shooter 
conducts BDA to verify if the engaged targets are killed. Similar to Y. Aviv and M. Kress 
(1997), we assume that there are no false-positive errors, that is, a live target will never 
appear to the shooter as killed since a kill indication is usually obtained with certainty 
under extreme conditions (e.g., explosion or fire). It follows that if the shooter identifies a 
target as killed, it is indeed killed or evidently killed (EK). If a target is not identified as 
killed, which implies that it is either killed (but not EK) or still alive, then in the next 
salvo the shooter will engage it once again, hence the name persistent shooter. Fresh 
targets are engaged in salvo (n+1) only if some targets become EK in salvo n; EK targets 
are always replaced in the target set of a salvo by fresh targets. This process is repeated 
until either all targets are EK or the shooter runs out of ammunition. We assume that a 
killed, but not yet EK, target emits similar signs when hit as a live target and that the only 
way a killed target can become EK is if it is hit and “killed” again. To simplify the 
exposition we assume that the probability of a kill given a hit is 1. Thus, in order for a 
killed target to become EK it must be hit again. 
B.  PROBABILITY MODEL FOR THE SHOOTING PROCESS 
In this section, we introduce a general Markov chain model for Persistent 
Shooting tactics when the engagement is conducted as a series of salvos. The shooter 
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selects the first set of targets to be engaged in a salvo size n out of a cluster of k targets at 
random and keeps engaging these targets as long as they are not EK. The state of the 
battle is described by the number of targets that are killed and evidently killed. These 
numbers are denoted by x and y, respectively. 
The possible values for the number of killed targets, x, range between 0, when all 
targets are alive, and k, when all the targets are killed. Clearly, for a given x, the number 
of EK targets y is bounded above by x. The lower bound on y is determined by the value 
of x. If x n≤ , then the lower bound on y is 0; however, if x n>  then, according to the 
engagement rule of the persistent shooter, the lower bound is x n− . 
The total number of possible states is given by the sum of possible cases as 
discussed above. When x n≤ , the possible states is given by ( )1
2
+ nn , and when x n>  
then the possible states number is ( )( )1 1− + +k n n . 
Hence, the total number is:  
 ( )( ) ( )1 1 1
2
− + + + + nk n n n  (2.1) 
 
= ( )1 1
2
⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
nn k  
Recall that a state in the Markov chain is defined by (x, y) where x is the number 
of killed target and y is the number of evidently killed targets. After each salvo, the state 
transition is defined by (x, y) → (x + i, y + j). To determine the transition probabilities, 
we need to consider two possible cases regarding y. In the first case, the number of 
targets yet to be engaged (not yet EK) is greater than the number of rounds in the salvo, 
that is, the sum of the number of killed targets that are not evidently killed and live 
targets is larger than n. Formally, y k n≤ − . In the second case, the number of targets yet 
to be engaged is smaller than n. In the latter case, we assume that the size of the salvo is 
adjusted to the number of targets left and therefore the size of a salvo is smaller than n. 
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Case 1: ≤ −y k n  . The (x,y) → (x + i, y + j) transition probability is 




n y x i x y l l i ji l j
i
n y x l ix yp p p p q q
i jl
−+ − − − − + −
=
+ − +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  (2.2) 
where, 
p – Probability of hit (=kill) 
q – Probability that a hit is detected. 
The transition probability in (2.2) is derived as follows. First, the probability of i 
new killed targets is obtained from a binomial distribution with parameters (n + y - x ), 
which is the number of live targets in the salvo, and p, the hit (kill) probability. Second, 
given i new killed targets in that salvo, the probability of j new EK targets depends on i 
and on the number l of previously killed (but not EK) targets that have been hit again in 
that salvo. The latter number can be between 0 and (x-y) and also has a binomial 
distribution with parameters (x-y) and p.  
Finally, given i + l new hits, the number of EK indications among them is a 
binomial random variable with parameters (i + l) and q.    
Case 2: > −y k n . The (x,y) → (x + i, y + j) transition probability is 




k x i x y l l i ji l j
i
k x l ix yp p p p q q
i jl
−− − − − + −
=
− +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  (2.3) 
In this case, the number of new killed targets is bounded by k-x. Clearly, the state 
(k,k) is absorbing.  
The case of n = 1 is studied in Aviv and Kress (1997). In that case the condition is  
 1− ≤ ≤x y x  (2.4) 
The probability distribution of the number of killed targets X is derived from the 
Negative Binomial distribution and is given by  






Pr[The (x-1)th EK indication was obtained at the i-th round]* 
 Pr[At least one target is killed in the rest n-i rounds] 
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1 αα  
where pqα = . 
 C.  ANALYSIS 
The formulas for the transition probabilities given in Section B have been 
implemented in MATLAB to produce the analysis presented in this section. A base case 
with the following values is used to determine the effects of each parameter used in the 
equation above. 
• Number of salvos fired, x = 5 
• Number of round fired per salvo, n = 2 
• Number of VT targets, k = 5 
• Probability of kill in each salvo, p = 0.5 
• Probability of Battle Damage Assessment, q = 0.7 
The results and interpretation of the different setting of the analysis are as 
follows: 
Case 1:  Fixed: p = 0.5, q = 0.7, n = 2, k = 5 
Varying: x = [1, 30] 
Figure 5 shows that E[k] increases with x in a linear relationship in the initial 
values of 1 to 6. Thereafter, the graph has a nonlinear relationship that goes 
asymptotically towards 5. This is because the E[k] will reach the steady state of the total 
number of available VTs with a huge number of salvos being fired. However, in the 
battlefield, we normally do not need to eliminate all the VTs as killing up to a certain 
threshold will disable the enemy’s effectiveness. 
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Figure 5.   Plot of E[k] vs. x 
Case 2; Fixed: p = 0.5, q = 0.7, k = 5, x = 5 
Varying: n = [2, 7] 
Figure 6 shows that E[k] increases with n in a nonlinear relationship. The value of 
E[k] goes to 4.4838 starting from n = 5. 
 
 









Case 3: Fixed: p = 0.5, q = 0.7, n = 2, x = 5 
Varying: k = [1, 10] 
Figure 7 shows that E[k] increases with k, similar to E[k] vs. n where there is a 
nonlinear relationship between E[k] and k at the initial phase of the graph and it tapers 
towards a steady state value of 3.4688 when k is greater than 10. 
 
  
Figure 7.   Plot of E[k] vs k 
Case 4: Fixed: q = 0.7, n = 2, k = 5, x = 5 
Varying: p = [0, 1] 
Figure 8 shows that E[k] increases with p, with a maximum E[k] value of 4.8164 
when p=1. 
 
Figure 8.   Plot of E[k] vs p 
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Case 5: Fixed: p = 0.5, n = 2, k = 5, x = 5 
Varying: q = [0, 1] 
Figure 9 shows that E[k] increases with q, there is a linear relationship between 
them at the initial value of E[k] which start off higher at 1.9375 when compared to the 
case when we are varying p. However, the value of E[k] with q = 1 has a lower value of 
4.2832 compared to the case when p varies. 
 
  
Figure 9.   Plot of E[k] vs q 
Case 6: Fixed: p = 0.5, q = 0.7, k = 50, total number of rounds available = 100. 
Varying n and k. 
For example, when the number of rounds used during each salvo, n = 2, 
the number of salvo, x = 100/2 = 50. 
 
Figure 10 shows that the expected number of killed targets, E[k], is increasing 
with the number of rounds used in each salvo, even though the rounds available in each 
case is fixed at 100. This increase in E[k] shows that it is favorable in situations when the 
available munitions in combat are limited to use a higher order number of salvos to kill 











Figure 10.   Plot of E[k] vs. n 
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III.  TRANSPORTATION TACTICS IN THE PRESENCE OF IEDS 
In this chapter, we develop models that capture key aspects of convoy 
transportation on roads infested with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). We develop 
continuous-time Markov models (CTMC) that describe the situation and implement them 
computationally to obtain some tactical insights regarding the effect of various 
operational parameters on the outcome of convoy transportation missions in the presence 
of IEDs. 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION 
We consider a road segment (RS) in which the red side (insurgents/terrorists) is 
placing IEDs to prevent the blue side (friendly forces) from transporting supplies via 
convoys through that road. The blue side has IED-clearance units that patrol the RS, 
searching for IEDs and attempting to neutralize them. There are three processes that 
determine the situation: (1) Red placing IEDs on the RS, (2) blue forces dispatching 
supply convoys that must cross the RS and thus are vulnerable to IED attacks, and (3) 
blue IED-clearance units patrolling the RS, detecting, and neutralizing IEDs. These 
processes are governed by the following assumptions. 
• Red places IEDs on the RS, one at the time, according to a Poisson 
process with parameter λ . The maximum IED-capacity of the road 
segment is M, that is, Red, who has perfect situational awareness, stops 
placing new IEDs if the number of IEDs on the road segment is M.   
• Blue dispatches convoys, one at the time, according to a Poison process 
with rate 1μ . A convoy is subject to damage due to IEDs. The number of 
vehicles in a convoy, denoted by k, is larger than the maximum IED 
capacity M.  
• Each IED is actuated independently by the convoy with probability α . A 
“successful” actuation of an IED removes one truck from the convoy with 
(conditional) probability, q. The actuations and removals are independent. 
• Once a convoy is dispatched, it completes traversing the segment before 
any other event occurs. 
• Blue dispatches clearance patrol units, one at the time, for detecting and 
neutralizing IEDs according to a Poisson process with rate 2μ   
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• The clearance team detects and neutralizes an IED with probability p and 
the detections/neutralizations are independent. The clearance team is not 
vulnerable to IED attacks. 
• Once a clearance team is dispatched it completes traversing the segment 
before any other event occurs. 
• The travel time of Blue units (convoys and clearance units) on the RS is 
short compared to the other temporal parameters. Thus, we assume that 
these units traverse the RS instantaneously. (See also Assumptions 4 and 
7.) This assumption is relaxed later on.  
B.  CTMC MODEL  
In this section, we introduce a continuous-time Markov model for the situation 
described in Section A. A state in this model is the number of IEDs planted along the 
road segment, m, where m = 0, 1, ...., M. Figure 11 shows the transition diagram for the 
case where M=3.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Birth-Death Process of the IEDs Model 
Each node in Figure 11 represents a state and a left-to-right edge corresponds to a 
placement of an IED. The intensity that corresponds to each such edge is λ (see 
Assumption 1 in Section A). The right-to-left edges represent removals of IEDs by the 
friendly force either by detecting and neutralizing the IED by a clearance patrol unit or by 
actuating the IED by a convoy. From assumptions 2, 3, and 4 in Section A, the rate at 
which IEDs are removed from the segment are a combination of clearance and convoy-
actuation rates. Specifically, if there are m IEDs present in the road segment, then the  
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removal rate depends on the deployment rates 1μ  and 2μ  of convoys and patrol units, 
respectively, and on the actuation probability (α ) and the detection/neutralization 
probability (p) of these units, respectively.  
We describe the process by its infinitesimal generator (IG) matrix. The off-
diagonal entries of an IG matrix are the transition rates among the states of the process, 
while each entry on the diagonal is the negative sum of the other entries in that row. 
Thus, the sum of each row adds up to 0. We use the IG matrix to obtain the steady state 
probabilities as shown below in Equations 3.2 and 3.3. For details see (Minh, 2001). In 
our case, since a state is defined as the number of IEDs in the RS, the dimension of the 
IG matrix is M+1. The transition rates are:  
(m) → (m+1) with transition rate λ  
(m) → (i), i = 0, 1... m-1 with transition rate  
 ( ) ( )1 21 1i im i m im ma p pi iμ α μ− −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (3.1) 
The above transition rates generate the IG matrix of the placement, actuations and 
neutralization of the IEDS. Table 1 presents the IG matrix for the case M = 3 shown in 
Figure 11.  
 
A = 
m 0 1 2 3 
0 - λ  λ  0 0 
1 (μ1α + μ2p)  -( λ+(μ1α + μ2p))  λ  0 
2 (μ1α2 + μ2p2) (2μ1α(1- α) + 2μ2p(1-p)) -((μ1α2 + μ2p2)+ (2μ1α(1- α) 
+ 2μ2p(1-p))+ λ ) 
λ 
3 (μ1α3 + μ2p3) (3μ1α2(1- α) + 3μ2p2(1-p)) (3μ1α(1- α)2 + 3μ2p(1-p)2) -((μ1α3 + μ2p3)+ (3μ1α2(1- α) + 3μ2p2(1-
p)) + (3μ1α(1- α)2 + 3μ2p(1-p)2)) 
Table 1.   The IG Matrix for M=3 
The steady state probabilities must satisfy: 
 
0
0.1.... 1 1π π
=
∑ = = =∑Mm m m
m
M  (3.2) 
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Let Aˆ  denote the IG matrix A where its last column is replaced by a column of 
1’s. The steady state probabilities are given by:  
 10 1 ˆ( , ,..., ) (0,0,...,1)π π π −=M A  (3.3) 
We can now obtain the steady state rate of attrition η (expected number of trucks 
hit per unit time) by conditioning on the number of IEDs. Given m IEDs, with probability 










Next, we wish to obtain the mean and variance of the number of trucks hit in a 
given time horizon [0, ]t . Let ( )Z t  be a random variable that counts the number of trucks 




 if ( ) 0
( )
0    if    ( ) 0
=







where ( )N t  is the number of convoys dispatched during [0, ]t , which is a Poisson random 
variable with mean and variance 1tμ , and iX  is the number of trucks hit in the i-the 
convoy.  
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( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]
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= = =
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 (3.6) 
Next, we compute the mean and variance of ( )Z t . Clearly 








[ ( )] [ ] [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )]( ( ))




∑N t i i i
i
i i
Var Z t Var X E N t Var X Var N t E X
t Var X E X
 (3.7) 
where ( )iE X  and [ ]iVar X  are given above. 
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C.  ANALYSIS 
The model developed in Section B has been implemented in MATLAB to 
produce the analysis presented in this section. The following values are used as a base 
case for the analysis. The time resolution is in days. 
• The maximum “IED capacity” of the segment, M = 3 
• IEDs placement rate, λ = 1 
• Convoys dispatch rate, 1μ  = 1 
• Probability of IED hitting a convoy, α  = 0.5 
• IEDs detecting and neutralizing rate, 2μ  = 2 
• Probability of detecting and neutralizing IEDs, p = 0.7. 
• Conditional probability that a successful actuation of an IED removes a 
truck from the convoy, q = 0.5. 
First we note that the expected daily rate of attrition η  = 0.1278 truck per day. 
The mean and variance of the number of trucks hit in a period of one month are: 
[ ( )] [ ( )] [ ] .iE Z t E N t E X tη= =  






[ ( )] [ ] [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )]( ( ))





Var Z t Var X E N t Var X Var N t E X






The values show that on the average there will be about 4 trucks being hit by 
IEDs every month with a standard deviation of about 2.2 trucks per month. Therefore, the 
P [Z (t) ≥ 5] can be estimated from the Central Limit Theorem as follows. 
( )P Z t  5  = P [Z ]
5 3.84P [ Z ]
2.2









In the following, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the base case. 
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Case 1: Varying the IED capacity of the RS. M = [1, 10] 
Figure 12 shows that the expected rate of attrition η increases with M in a non-
linear fashion. The value of η  when M = 1 is 0.0826, while the values ofη  for M greater 
than 5 level off at 0.1316. This behavior of η shows that the steady state attrition rate is 
saturated at M = 5. Thus increasing the capacity of the RS beyond 5 IEDs by Red will not 
affect the expected rate of Blue’s attrition. This phenomenon is due to the relatively high 
IED clearance rate (both by convoys and clearance units) compared to the placement rate 
of IEDs by Red. Thus, although the capacity is high, it is never reached. Therefore, the 




λ αμ α μ+ , which is 0.1316. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Plot of η  vs. M 
Case 2: Varying the rate at which Red is planting IEDs. λ  = [0.5, 3] 
Figure 13 shows that in this range of λ , η  increases almost linearly with the rate 
at which Red plants IEDs. For example, if Red doubles the intensity of attacks from one 
IED a day to two IEDs a day, then the expected rate of attrition increases from 0.1278 a 




Figure 13.   Plot of η  vs. λ  
Case 3: Varying the rate at which Red is planting IEDs. λ  = [0, 36]  
Figure 14 is an expansion of Case 2 with the range of λ  increasing from 0 to 36. 
The plot shows that while initially η  increases with λ  almost linearly. This relationship 
eventually levels off and approaches asymptotically to 0.75. The asymptotic value is 
equal to .M qα  When Red can plant IEDs almost instantly, there will always be M IEDs 
on the RS and therefore the expected number of trucks hit by IEDs is the expected value 
of a Binomial distribution with parameters M and .qα  
 
 
Figure 14.   Plot of η  vs. λ  
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Case 4: Varying the dispatch rate of convoys. 1μ  = [0.25, 3] 
Figure 15 shows that in this range of 1,μ η  increases almost linearly with the rate 
at which Blue dispatches its convoys. If Blue doubles the rate at which it sends its 
convoys from one truck a day to two trucks a day, then the expected rate of casualties 
increases from 0.1278 a day to 0.2049 a day. Therefore, it is crucial to only schedule a 
convoy when there is a need. The number of convoys passing the road segment should be 
minimized. 
 
Figure 15.   Plot of η  vs. 1μ  
Case 5: Varying the dispatch rate of convoys. 1μ  = [0, 33] 
Figure 16 is an expansion of Case 4 with the range of 1μ  increasing from 0 to 33. 
The plot shows that while initially η  increases with 1μ  almost linearly, this relationship 
eventually levels off and approaches asymptotically 0.5. If the convoys are dispatched 
very frequently, then each planted IED is immediately actuated and a fraction q of these 




Figure 16.   Plot of η  vs. 1μ  
Case 6: Varying the IEDs detecting and neutralizing rate, 2μ  = [0.5, 4] 
Figure 17 shows that in this range of 2μ  η  decreases exponentially with the rate 
at which Blue dispatches the clearance units. If Blue doubles the rate of dispatching these 
teams from one team a day to two teams a day then the expected rate of casualties 
decreases significantly from 0.1937 a day to 0.1278 a day.  
 





Case 7: Varying the IEDs detecting and neutralizing rate, 2μ  = [0, 33] 
The expansion of Case 6 for the range of 2μ  from 0 to 33 is shown in Figure 18. 
We can see that the value of η  is approaching 0 as 2μ  goes to ∞ . This phenomenon 
happens because the rate at which the clearance teams are clearing the IEDs is much 
faster than the rate the Red is deploying the IEDs in the RS. Thus, the convoys face no 
threat. The significant drop in the expected rate of casualties is when μ2 is smaller than 5. 
Beyond this value, the effect is marginal.  
 
Figure 18.   Plot of η  vs. 2μ  
Case 8: Varying the probability of IED hitting a convoy, α  = [0, 1] 
Figure 19 shows that η  increases with α in almost a linear relationship. The 
expected rate of casualties increases by about 0.025 when the probability of the IED 
hitting a convoy increases by 0.1. We note that although this parameter does not 
contribute significantly to the expected rate of casualties, in practice the coalition forces 
invest quite a lot in jamming devices that are intended to reduce this parameter (G. 




Figure 19.   Plot of η  vs. α  
Case 9: Varying probability of detecting and neutralizing IEDs, p = [0, 1] 
Similarly to the result shown in Case 7, if the probability of detecting and 
neutralizing the IED increases, the steady state rate of attrition will decrease significantly. 
However, the rate that expected rate of casualties decreases a slower rate compared to 
case 7. Figure 20 shows that if Blue doubles the probability of detecting and neutralizing 
the IEDs from 0.2 to 0.4, then the expected rate of casualties decreases from 0.2503 a day 
to 0.1823 a day.  
 





Case 10: Varying: 1μ , 2μ  = [1, 15] 
Figure 21 shows that the expected rate of casualties increases when the intensity 
at which Blue is sending out convoys is increasing and the intensity of sending out 
clearance units is small. For example, the highest expected rate of causalities is 0.4571 a 
day when the 1μ  = 15 and 2μ  = 1, compared to 0.0227 a day when 1μ  = 1 and 2μ = 15. 
Therefore, it is crucial to only schedule convoys when there is a need and to increase the 
rate at which clearance teams are dispatched.  
 
 
Figure 21.   Plot of η  vs. 1μ and 2μ  
Case 11: Varying: p, α  = [0, 1] 
Figure 22 shows that the expected rate of causalities has the highest value when 
the probability of an IED hitting a convoy , α  =1 and the probability of detecting and 
neutralizing IEDs, p = 0. For example, the highest expected rate of causalities is 0.4375 a 
day when the probability of IED hitting a convoy is 1 and the probability of detecting and 
neutralizing is 0 compared to the rate 0 a day when α  =0. Given the two options with 
respect to the base case, to reduce α by 20% or increase p by 20%, it will be more 

















Figure 22.   Plot of η  vs. p and α  
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IV.  A SUPPLY MODEL IN THE PRESENCE OF IEDS 
In this chapter, we build on the base model that was discussed in Chapter 3 to 
capture key aspects of supply convoy transportation on roads infested with Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs). We develop a continuous-time Markov model (CTMC) that 
describes the situation and implement it to obtain some tactical insights regarding the 
effect of various tactical parameters that affect the outcome of supply convoy 
transportation missions. 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION 
We consider a RS in which Red places IEDs to prevent Blue from transporting 
supply convoys through that road. The processes and assumptions that are governing the 
placing, detecting, and neutralizing of IEDs and dispatch rate of convoys are the same as 
described in Part A of Chapter III. Blue’s destination point has a demand that consumes 
the supply according to the Poisson process with the parameter θ . The supply level in the 
destination point is denoted by s and has an ordering point, denoted by σ . The demand is 
measured in truckloads. Once the supply level at the destination point is less than or equal 
to the order point, an order is placed and Blue will dispatch its convoy, comprising k 
trucks, after a setup time that has exponential distribution with parameter 1μ . No convoy 
is dispatched if the inventory in the destination point is higher that the ordering point, σ . 
B.  CTMC MODEL  
In this section, we introduce a continuous-time Markov model for the situation 
described in Section A. The state of the model is described by the number of IEDs in the 






The possible values for the number of IEDs in the RS, m, range between 0, when 
there are no IEDs to M, when the number of IEDs in the RS is at its maximum. The 
possible values for the supply level at the destination point, s, ranges between 0, when the 
inventory is totally depleted, and σ  + k, when the inventory is at its ordering threshold 
and k trucks arrive at the destination point.  
The total number of possible states (m, s) is given by the product of the possible 
number of IEDs, M+1, and the 1σ + +k  possible inventory levels at the destination point: 
( )( )1 1σ+ + +M k , which is also the dimension of the corresponding infinitesimal 
generator (IG) matrix. The transition rates are given in the following cases. 
Case 1: (m, s) → (m+1, s) with transition rate λ  
This happens when there is no consumption at the destination point and the 
enemy places one IED. 
Case 2: (m, s) → (m, s-1) with transition rate θ  
This happens when there is consumption of one supply unit at the destination 
point and Red did not place any IEDs on the RS. 
Case 3: s > σ  
(m, s ) → (m-i, s) 
i = 1, 2..., m with transition rate  
 ( )2 1 m iim p piμ
−⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (4.1) 
When the supply level, s, is greater than the ordering point, σ , no order is placed 
and thus no convoy is dispatched. The only possible state change is when the clearance 
team manages to detect and neutralize IEDs in the RS. 
Case 4: s  σ≤  ` 
 
(m, s ) → (m-i , s), 
i = 1, 2,....., m with transition rate  
 ( )2 1 m iim p piμ
−⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (4.2) 
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This transition occurs when the next event is dispatching a clearance team, which 
detects and clears i IEDs. This transition is the same as in Case 3. 
(m, s ) → (m-i, s+k-j), 
i = 0, 1, 2....., m  
j = 0, 1, 2......., i with transition rate  
 ( ) ( )1 1 1m i i ji jm i q qm jμ α α
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (4.3) 
When the supply level s is less than or equal to the order point σ , an order is 
triggered and a convoy of k trucks is sent to the destination point to meet the demand. 
This transition occurs if and only if the next event is a dispatching of a convoy. In that 
event i IEDs are actuated, with probability ( )1 1 m iimiμ α α
−⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  out of which j actuations 
are damaging, with probability equal to ( )1 i jji q q
j
−⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . The remaining k-j trucks 
successfully deliver the k-j units of supply to the destination point.  
The above transition rates generate the IG matrix of the placement, actuation and 
neutralization of the IEDS and the supply level as discussed above. Table 2 presents the 
IG matrix for the case M = 1, σ  = 1 and k = 2.  
A =  
(m,s) 00 01 02 03 10 11 12 13 
00 -(μ1+ λ) 0 μ1 0 λ 0 0 0 
01 θ - (θ+μ1+ λ) 0 μ1 0 λ 0 0 
02 0 θ - (θ+μ1+ λ) 0 0 0 λ 0 
03 0 0 θ - (θ+μ1+ λ) 0 0 0 λ 
10 μ2p μ1 (α)(q) μ1 (α)(1-q) 0 
-(μ2p + μ1 (α)(q) + μ1 
(α)(1-q) + μ1 (1-α))   0 μ1 (1-α) 0 
11 0 μ2p μ1 (α)(q) μ1 (α)(1-q) θ 
-(θ + μ2p + μ1 (α)(q) + 
μ1 (α)(1-q) + μ1 (1-α)) 0 μ1 (1-α) 
12 0 0 μ2p 0 0 θ -(μ2p + θ) 0 
13 0 0 0 μ2p 0 0 θ -(μ2p + θ)
Table 2.   The IG Matrix for M=1, σ =1 and k =2 
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The steady state probabilities must satisfy: 
 
0
0.1.... 1 1π π
=
∑ = = =∑Mm m
m
M m  (4.4) 
Let Aˆ  denote the IG matrix A where its last column is replaced by a column of 
1’s. The steady state probabilities are given by:  
 10 1 ˆ( , ,..., ) (0,0,...,1)π π π −=M A  (4.5) 
C.  ANALYSIS  
The model developed in Section B has been implemented in MATLAB to 
produce the analysis presented in this section. The following values are used as base case 
to determine the effects of each parameter used in the model. 
• The maximum “IED capacity” of the segment, M = 3 
• IEDs placement rate, λ = 1 
• Convoys dispatch rate, μ 1 = 1. 
• Probability of IED hitting a convoy, α  = 0.5. 
• IEDs detecting and neutralizing rate, 2μ  = 2. 
• Probability of detecting and neutralizing IEDs, p = 0.7 
• Conditional probability of successful actuation of an IED removing a truck 
from the convoy, q = 0.5 
• Demand rate for supply at the destination point, θ  = 1 
• Reorder level at the destination point, σ  = 3 
• Number of trucks in the convoy, k = 5 
Figure 23 presents the long-run Probability Mass Function (PMF) of the number 
of active IEDs on the RS, varying from 0 to 3 (=M).  
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Figure 23.   Plot of the PMF P (m) vs. m 
The long-run PMF P(s) of the possible values for the supply level at the 
destination point is shown in Figure 24. The supply level s is varied from 0 to 8 (= σ  + 
k). 
 
Figure 24.   Plot of P(s) vs. s 
From the plots above, we can see that the P (m) is decreasing as m increases, 
which means that for the case when M is 3, the long-run probability of having no IEDs in 
the RS is the highest. The highest value of P(s) is when s is 4. This is the point that is 
right after the reorder point of 3. P(s) starts to decrease as s increases from 5 to 8. 
In the following, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the base case. 
The time resolution is in days.  
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Case 1: Varying the IED capacity of the RS, M= [1, 4]  
Figure 25 shows that the long-run expected number of IEDs increases from 
0.3994 when M = 1 to 0.6533 when M = 4. It has the same trend as the Case 1 in Chapter 
3. The expected number of IEDs is increasing when the maximum “IED capacity” of the 
segment is increasing as well. However, Figure 26 shows that the long-run expected 
number of supply units in the destination point is decreasing as M increases. The long run 
expected number of supply units, E(s), decreases from 4.956 units when M = 1 to 4.9297 
units when M = 4. Evidently, this is not a significant decrease in the average supply level 
at the destination point and thus the IED capacity has little logistical effect.  
 
Figure 25.   Plot of E(m) vs. M 
 
Figure 26.   Plot of E(s) vs. M 
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Case 2: Varying the number of trucks in a convoy, k = [4, 7] 
Figure 27 shows that the expected number of IEDs slightly increases from 0.622 
when k = 4 to 0.6439 when k = 7. At a first look this behavior seems counter intuitive as 
we would expect E(m) to decrease when the number of trucks passing through the RS 
increases. However, this trend may be explained by the fact that longer convoys result in 
a smaller number of dispatches, and thus fewer convoys-IED encounters.  
 
Figure 27.   Plot of E(m) vs. k 
Figure 28 shows that the long-run expected number of supply units in the 
destination point is increasing as the number of trucks in the convoy increases. The 
expected number of supply units increases from 4.419 unit when k = 4 to 5.945 unit when 
k = 7.  
 
Figure 28.   Plot of E(s) vs. k 
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Case 3: Varying IEDs placement rate, λ  = [0.25, 2] 
Figure 29 shows that the long run expected number of IEDs increases when the 
IEDs placement rate λ  increases. E(m) increases significantly from 0.1659 when λ  = 
0.25 to 1.1161 when λ  = 2. Figure 30 shows that the expected number of supply units 
decreases as IEDs placement rate λ  increases. The expected number of supply units 
decreases from 4.982 unit when λ  = 0.25 to 4.88 unit when λ  = 2. In both plots, the 
relations are almost linear as the number of IEDs in the RS has not reached the maximum 
capacity, as shown in Case 3 in Chapter III. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Plot of E(m) vs. λ  
 
Figure 30.   Plot of E(s) vs. λ 
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Case 4: Varying convoys dispatch rate, 1μ  = [0.5, 4] 
Figure 31 shows that in this range of 1μ , the long run expected number of IEDs in 
the RS is initially decreasing with 1μ  almost linearly, and this relationship eventually 
levels off and approaches asymptotically to 0.63. If Blue doubles the rate at which it 
sending its convoys from one truck a day to two trucks a day, then the long-run expected 
number of IEDs decreases from 0.632 to 0.6308. This is not a significant increase as the 
demand is not high. However, when there is unlimited demand rate for supply at the 
destination point, E(m) in the RS will be decreasing as shown the plot below.  
 
Figure 31.   Plot of E(m) vs. 1μ  
Figure 32 shows that in this range of μ1, the expected number of supply units is 
initially increasing with 1μ  almost linearly; this relationship eventually levels off and 
approaches asymptotically to 8, which is σ + k. If Blue doubles the rate at which it is 
sending its convoys from one truck a day to two trucks a day, then the expected number 




Figure 32.   Plot of E(s) vs. 1μ  
Case 5: Varying IEDs detecting and neutralizing rate, 2μ  = [0.5, 4] 
Similar to Case 4, Figure 33 shows that in this range of μ2, the long run expected 
number of IEDs in the RS is initially decreasing with 2μ  almost linearly, this relationship 
eventually levels off and approaches asymptotically to 0. If the detection and 
neutralization rate are much faster than the Red IEDs deployment rate, the E(m) will 
eventually become insignificant. With these results, the E(s) shown in Figure 34 will 
eventually go to 5 units at steady state. 
 
 
Figure 33.   Plot of E(m) vs. 2μ  
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Figure 34.   Plot of E(s) vs. 2μ  
Case 6: Varying order point in the destination point: σ  = [1, 5] 
Figure 35 shows that E(m) decreases with reorder level σ  at the destination point, 
given that the maximum IED capacity in the RS is 3, the long run expected number of 
IEDs in the RS will start to level off when the order point is beyond the IED capacity. As 
shown in the plot, the E(m) decreases from 0.6348 when σ  =1 to 0.6315 when σ  = 5. 
However, the E(s) is increasing when the order point in the destination point, σ is 
increasing. The value of E(s) increases from 3.112 unit to 6.9157 a day when σ  is 
increased from 1 to 5.  
 
 
Figure 35.   Plot of E(m) vs. σ  
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Figure 36.   Plot of E(s) vs. σ  
Case 7: Varying friendly force’s destination point inventory demand rate, θ  = 
[0.5, 4] 
Figure 37 shows that E(m) decreases with Blue’s destination point inventory 
demand, θ . As shown in the plot, the E(m) decreases from 0.632 when θ  =1 to 0.5613 
when θ  = 4. This trend is due to Blue sending more convoys to satisfy the destination 
point demand. However, even though there are more convoys being sent, Figure 38 
shows that E(s) decreases with Blue’s destination point inventory demand, θ . Its value 
decreases from 5.4318 when θ  =1 to 2.804 when θ  = 4.  
 
 
Figure 37.   Plot of E(m) vs. θ  
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Figure 38.   Plot of E(s) vs. θ  
Case 8: Varying k and M = [1, 10 
Figure 39 shows that E(m) increases from 0.66 when M = 5 and k = 5 to 0.6886 a 
day when M = 10 and k = 10. The relatively high IED clearance rate (both by convoys 
and clearance units) compared to the placing rate of IEDs decreases the rate that the 
trucks are being removed for the RS. Figure 40 shows that E(s) is also increasing with 
both M and k, E(s) increases 4.929 from when M = 5 and k = 5 to 7.4509 a day when M = 
10 and k = 10.  
 
 
Figure 39.   Plot of E(m) vs. M and k 
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Figure 40.   Plot of E(s) vs. M and k 
Case 9: Varying 1μ  and 2μ  = [1,15] 
Figure 41 shows that E(m) is decreasing when 2μ  is increasing while 1μ  is at 
almost a constant plane for all values of 2μ . The value of E(m) decreases from 0.2756 
when 1μ  = 5 and 2μ  = 5 to 0.1406 when both parameters double to 10.  
 
 
Figure 41.   Plot of E(m) vs. 1μ  and 2μ   
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Figure 42 shows that it is the opposite for the values of E(s), that is E(s) 
increasing when 1μ  is increasing while 2μ  is at almost at a constant plane for all values 
of 2μ . The value of E(s) increases from 5.7764 when 1μ  = 5 and 2μ  = 5 to 5.8871 when 
both parameters double to 10. Therefore, it is important for Blue to invest in technology 
to improve the IED' detecting and neutralizing rate to reduce the loss of convoys and 
successful delivery of supplies. 
 
Figure 42.   Plot of E(s) vs. 1μ  and 2μ  
Case 10: Varying α  = [0,1] and 1μ  = [1,15] 
Figure 43 shows that E(m) decreasing with α in a plane. 1μ  does not have a 
significant impact in the values of E(m). The values of E(m) decrease from 0.6742 when 
α  = 0 and 1μ  = 5 to 0.5827 n α  = 1 and 1μ  = 15. Figure 43 shows that E(s) is 
increasing when 1μ  is increasing, while α  does not have much significant impact in the 
value of E(s). The value of E(s) increases from 5 when α  = 0 and 1μ  = 1 to 5.8055 when 
α  = 1 and 1μ  = 15. This increase is mainly due to Red being unable to place enough IED 




Figure 43.   Plot of E(m) vs. α  and 1μ  
 
Figure 44.   Plot of E(s) vs. α  and 1μ  
Case 11: Varying p = [0,1] and 2μ  = [1,15] 
Figure 45 shows that E(m) is decreasing when p and 2μ  are increasing. The 
values of E(m) is at a constant value of 2.511 when p = 0 for all values of 2μ , and the 




probability of detecting and neutralizing the IEDs and rate of the clearance unit is 
clearing the IEDs are at their highest). Given this information, Figure 46 shows that E(s) 
is also at its peak when the value of E(m) is at its lowest. 
 
 
Figure 45.   Plot of E(m) vs. p and 2μ  
 




Case 12: Varying σ  and θ  = [1, 15] 
Figure 47 shows that E(m) decreases from 0.5416 when σ  = 1 and θ  = 1 to 
0.6348 when σ  = 10 and θ  = 10. The value of E(m) seems to have leveled off when both 
σ and θ are at their higher values. This is evidenced in Figure 48, as E(s) also level off 
when both σ  and θ  are at their higher values. 
 
 
Figure 47.   Plot of E(m) vs. σ  and θ  
 
Figure 48.   Plot of E(s) vs. σ  and θ  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, we highlight the key conclusions and recommendations that are 
derived from the Markov models presented in this thesis.  
A. PERSISTENT SHOOTING TACTICS USING SALVOS 
From the model developed with the choice of base case in Chapter II, we can 
conclude that both the number of salvos fired, x, and the number of rounds fired in each 
salvo has a significant impact on the expected number of killed targets, especially when 
both of these parameters are kept small because the expected number of killed targets will 
reach steady state when a huge number of munitions are fired. In practice, we do not need 
to eliminate all the VTs; killing up to a threshold may disable the enemy’s effectiveness. 
When the number of available munitions is limited, it is concluded that a higher number 
of smaller salvos is preferred to firing a large quantity of round in one or two salvos as it 
gives a higher expected number of killed targets.  
The model also shows that both the probability of BDA and the probability of kill 
play a significant role in expected number of killed targets. As such, the following 
courses of action are recommended: 
• Deliver higher number of munitions with small number of salvos as this 
will allow a higher expected rate of attrition with munitions preservation. 
• Improve both the probability of kill in each salvo and the probability of 
BDA as these two factors can greatly increase the expected rate of 
attrition.  
B.  TRANSPORTATION TACTICS IN THE PRESENCE OF IEDS 
Based on the model and choice of base case, which reflects a reasonable scenario, 
it is concluded that beyond a relatively small number (M = 5) of IEDs, the IED capacity 
of the RS does not affect the steady state attrition rate. The IED deployment rate by Red, 
λ , has a relatively strong influence the attrition rate. Also, the rate of convoys entering 
the road segment, 1μ , and the probability of hitting the convoy, α, have a significant  
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effect on increasing the steady state attrition rate. The two factors that help reduce the 
steady state attrition rate are the rate at which friendly forces detect and neutralize the 
IEDs, 2μ  , and the probability of detecting and neutralizing the IEDs, p.  
As such, the following courses of action are recommended: 
• Limit the rate of convoys travelling through the road segment by 
designating rendezvous points to muster the convoys before they are 
dispatched. However, this is highly dependent on the schedule of the 
supplies needed.  
• Improve the rate of dispatching clearance units and the probability of 
detection and neutralizing. Improving these two factors can greatly reduce 
the attrition rate of convoys.  
C.  SUPPLY MODEL IN THE PRESENCE OF IEDS 
Building on the basic model that was discussed in the above section with 
inventory control, similar to the results in the previous section, the IED deployment rate 
by Red, λ , and the IED capacity of the RS, M, increases the expected number of IEDs. 
The rate of convoys entering the road segment, 1μ , does not has a significant effect on 
increasing the expected number of IEDs in the RS. The factors that help reduce the 
expected number of IEDs in the RS are the rate at which friendly forces detect and 
neutralize the IEDs, 2μ  , order point in the destination point, σ, and the destination point 
inventory demand rate, θ . 
However, a counterintuitive trend is observed when the expected number of IEDs 
decreases while the number of trucks passing through the RS increases. However, this 
trend may be explained by the fact that longer convoys result in a smaller number of 
dispatches and thus fewer convoys-IED encounters.  
The expected number of supplies in the destination decreases when the IED 
deployment rate by Red, λ , the IED capacity of the RS, M, and the destination point 
inventory demand rate, θ , increases. The rate of convoys entering the road segment, 1μ , 
the number of truck passing the RS, k, the rate at which friendly force detect and 
neutralize the IEDs, 2μ , and order point in the destination point, σ , help increase the 
expected number of supplies in the destination point. 
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As such, the following courses of action are recommended to maintain the 
inventory level while minimizing risk. 
• Similar to the previous section, limit the rate of convoys travelling through 
the road segment by designating rendezvous points to muster the convoys 
before they are dispatched. However, this is highly dependent on the 
schedule of the supplies needed.  
• Increase the number of trucks in each convoy to deliver the supply thus 
reducing the frequency that the convoys need to be sent out. 
• Fix the order point in the destination level to a higher level by keeping a 
larger inventory, thus minimizing the number of trip the convoys need to 
take to supply the destination. However, this is not usually possible, 
especially with daily necessities. 
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